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This paper examines the validity of three approaches to estimate party positions on the general left–right and EU
dimensions. We newly introduce party elite data from the comprehensive IntUne survey and cross-validate it with
existing expert survey and manifesto data. The general left–right estimates generated by elites and experts show a
higher congruence than those derived from party manifestos; neither measure clearly materializes as more valid
regarding EU positions. We identify which factors explain diverging estimates. For instance, disagreement among
experts has greater impact than their mere number. The substantial centrist bias of the manifesto estimates persists
even when alternative documents are used to substitute manifestos. Low response rates among elites have no systematic
detrimental effect on the validity of party position estimates.
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Introduction
Ever since Downs (1957) and Black (1958) disseminated
the notion of spatial competition between political actors,
scholars have been increasingly interested in estimating
actors’ policy positions. In fact, locating the positions of
political parties on a given policy continuum is an essential
precondition for testing much of today’s theories of party
competition, government formation, and legislative
decision-making. For this purpose, political scientists have
developed a variety of approaches for estimating the policy
positions of political parties.
A direct consequence of this plurality of methods is a
considerable controversy among scholars that revolves
around the different methods’ validity and reliability. This
is particularly true for the two most prevalent approaches
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for positioning political parties in a comparative frame-
work: expert surveys and content analyses of party mani-
festos. Proponents of a document-based approach
forcefully contest the validity of expert-driven data (Best,
2013; Budge, 2000, 2001; McDonald et al., 2007). Advo-
cates of expert surveys, on the other hand, dispel the objec-
tions raised against the measurement quality and the
inherent limitations of expert data (Hooghe et al., 2010;
Steenbergen and Marks, 2007). Interestingly enough that
despite the importance of the issue, only a few scholarly
contributions have cross-validated the methods within one
study in order to examine each measure’s relative validity
(e.g. Bakker et al., 2015; Benoit and Laver, 2007; Hooghe
et al., 2010; Keman, 2007; Marks et al., 2007; see also
Adams et al., 2019 on party policy shifts). Moreover, look-
ing at these few exceptions in greater detail (for an over-
view see Online Appendix Tables A.1.–A.3.), reveals that
they only consider two methods at the same time or com-
pare position estimates derived from different question
wordings, especially due to the lack of comparable elite
data – the third generally recognized source for party pla-
cements (Laver, 2014).
We aim to narrow this research gap and our analyses
make the following three contributions to the field: First,
we present a relevant addition to the field by cross-
validating data from manifesto, expert, and elite studies
that were not only generated at roughly the same time, but
also relied on largely identical question wordings in the
surveys at both a left–right and European integration
dimension. This comprehensive approach is enabled by the
IntUne elite survey, probably the largest survey ever con-
ducted among political elites in Western Europe (Best
et al., 2012). The IntUne data provide the rare opportunity
to cross-validate party position estimates from expert and
manifesto data using estimates derived from MPs as exter-
nal yardstick. We argue that the IntUne data provide an
adequate alternative take at party placements as long as the
measurement error is not systematically correlated with
both the expert and the manifesto data. This does not imply,
however, that we see elite data as a gold standard of party
position estimates. Rather, we adopt the logic of triangula-
tion, which suggests that the amount of agreement of inde-
pendent measures carries information on their validity
(Marks, 2007). Our purpose thus is not to suggest using
elite surveys instead of manifestos or experts for the spatial
placement of political parties but to learn more about
whether one of the two methods most frequently used in
the context of the 21st century produces estimates that
diverge from the placements derived from two equally
credible sources.1 Second, we systematically discuss and
test two sets of factors that help explaining given variances
between elite data, on the one hand, and expert and mani-
festo data, on the other (i.e. manipulable measurement
characteristics and party characteristics). Third, moving
beyond simple cross-sectional analyses, we compare party
position estimates not only on a general left–right dimen-
sion, but also on a European integration dimension on two
points in time.
The logic of cross-validation of party position estimates
rests on the assumptions i) that the different data sources all
suffer from measurement error, and ii) that their systematic
biases do not overlap much (Marks et al., 2007: 23).
Accordingly, the standard approach to why measures
diverge centres on the technical properties of sources and
the process of extracting position data from them. While
the present article places itself in this tradition it also asks
in the concluding section whether the different nature of the
sources affect the results and whether diverging party pla-
cements can be interpreted consistently once we consider
categorial differences between the sources. If so, validity
concerns need to be related also to the specific research
questions to be addressed with the help of party position
data.
Expectations on differences between
measures
Based on the literature on party position estimates, we
develop our hypotheses on the differences between elite,
expert, and manifesto data (please note that reviewing the
entire spectrum of party position estimates is not our pri-
mary goal here, an overview can be found in the Online
Appendix A as well as in previous studies such as Mair,
2001; Volkens, 2007). We provide a list of factors that
might explain variation between party position estimates.
In so doing, we group the factors into measurement char-
acteristics and party characteristics. Our rationale is the
following: It is reasonable to assume that the differences
in the nature of the measures will result in differences in the
party position estimates. However, these differences
become problematic once they vary systematically with
either the measurement or the party at hand. Systematic
errors will lead to biased results in our analyses based on
individual party position estimates.
Manipulable measurement characteristics
Looking at the literature on party position estimates sug-
gests that a number of characteristics of the measurement
instrument drive measurement bias (e.g. Mair, 2001;
Volkens, 2007). This is particularly interesting for scholars
as they are, at least in principle, manipulable by the
researcher. Specifically, the aggregate nature of the policy
positions derived from expert surveys suggests that
the validity of expert-based measures is a function of i) the
number of experts evaluating the party positions and ii) the
extent of disagreement among experts (Hooghe et al., 2010;
Marks et al., 2007; Steenbergen and Marks, 2007). We thus
expect increasing the number of experts to reduce systema-
tic differences between measures. At the same time, higher
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levels of disagreement among experts should increase sys-
tematic differences between measures.
The same is true for position estimates derived from
elite surveys. In fact, low response rates are one of the main
critiques of surveys among political elites, in particular, as
responsive MPs are unlikely to be a random sample of all
party MPs and their opinions are therefore in some respect
likely to be unrepresentative of the party as a whole. Recent
research on two-party systems finds little empirical evi-
dence that elite surveys with lower response rates are
necessarily less representative of the population (Fisher and
Herrick, 2013). Yet in multi-party systems extremist parties
might be underrepresented and even respondents from such
parties might be less radical than non-respondents. While
we cannot address all potential concerns associated with
elite data, below we explore empirically whether reducing
the share of respondents adversely affects the correspon-
dence between measures.
Concerning estimates derived from election manifestos,
two particular characteristics of the party documents may
drive systematic differences between measures. A first
rather straightforward criterion is simply the total amount
of textual data provided. Thus, succinct pamphlets will
yield more imprecise measurements than lengthy accounts
on a wide range of policy issues (Marks et al., 2007: 27). A
second aspect that has attracted considerable attention
among critiques of the MARPOR/CMP project is docu-
ment selection (Gemenis, 2012, 2013; Hansen, 2008).2 The
Party position estimates are quite often derived from gen-
eral party programs (e.g. Grundsatzprogramme for the case
of Germany) that are not directly linked to a particular
election, from joint electoral manifestos of parties forming
pre-electoral alliances, or from speeches of leading candi-
dates during the election campaign. If neither of these alter-
native sources for party-specific election manifestos is
available, party position estimates are simply obtained via
interpolation. Naturally, document selection may thus be a
key factor in explaining systematic differences between
measures.
Party characteristics beyond control of researchers
Beyond these measurement attributes, party characteristics
out of the researchers’ control may likewise contribute to
systematic differences between measures. One such factor
is party extremism that scholars hypothesize to have detri-
mental effects on estimates derived from party manifestos.
Assuming that parties reveal their ‘true’ positions in their
manifestos, coder misclassification of coding units will
have a disproportionate effect on ‘extreme’ parties as
coders can increasingly err towards the centre the closer
parties are to either extreme of a given scale. As a result,
these parties are likely to be coded more moderate than
their ‘true’ policy position, which leads to a centrist bias
of position estimates derived from party manifestos
(Mikhaylov et al., 2012). If survey recruitment from extre-
mist parties is indeed biased towards the more moderate
MPs, the same centrist bias should affect measures from
elite surveys.
Concerning expert estimates, several authors concur that
their ability to pinpoint parties’ ‘true’ policy positions is
positively associated with party extremism (Hooghe et al.,
2010; Marks et al., 2007; Netjes and Binnema, 2007). A
stronger differentiation from other parties presumably
facilitates the acquisition of information and thus reduces
the uncertainty of experts where to place these parties on a
given policy continuum. In contrast, Lindstädt et al. (2020)
suggest that experts assessing parties at the extremes of the
scale can, similar to manifesto coders, only make mistakes
towards the middle of the scale. Overall, the expectations
on the effect of party extremism on expert estimates are
thus conflicting.
Furthermore, higher levels of intra-party divergence are
expected to severely obstruct experts’ ability to evaluate
parties. Given that the party leadership utters highly con-
flicting policy positions, the resulting cacophony will ren-
der it virtually impossible, even for experts, to discern a
single coherent policy position. Party manifestos are
equally assumed unable to accommodate divergence within
political parties. Accordingly, manifestos of internally
divided parties are likely to yield more imprecise position
estimates (Marks et al., 2007: 27). Intra-party divergence
will also affect estimates derived from elite surveys. In fact,
the validity of the aggregate party estimate derived from
MPs individual response will naturally decrease as the
extent of ideological conflict within political parties
increases.
An additional factor that restrains experts’ ability to
unambiguously identify parties’ policy positions are sub-
stantial policy shifts (Marks et al., 2007: 27). In line with
the literature on voters’ perceptions of policy positions
(e.g., Dahlberg, 2009), experts are similarly expected to
have a hard time determining parties’ policy positions
when faced with a highly erratic party system. Since
manifesto-based estimates are based upon one single doc-
ument for each time point, the measurement is unaffected
by policy shifts and this factor is therefore excluded from
the analysis. The same holds true for estimates derived
from political elite surveys.
Additional controls
Following Marks et al. (2007: 27–28), we also control for
another set of potential explanatory factors for differences
between elite data, expert judgments, and manifesto esti-
mates. The first is party size, as all data should yield results
that are more congruent as party vote share increases. Large
parties are present in the experts’ minds and it seems rea-
sonable to expect that experts thus hold more precise infor-
mation concerning the policy positions of larger parties.
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Larger parties should also provide more survey respon-
dents. With regard to party manifestos, Gabel and Huber
(2000) conjecture that parties with a large electoral basis
are more likely to provide informative manifestos, while
smaller parties may cater to a particular target electorate
and thus emphasize specific policy issues. This, in turn,
may jeopardize the validity of position estimates based
on smaller parties’ manifestos.
A similar argument holds true for party age. Again, it
seems plausible to expect that long-established parties are
not only actors visible and well known to the experts but
that older and established parties also publish manifestos
that are more thorough and provide internal and external
orientation. Both effects should thus decrease any systema-
tic differences between measures. Another potentially rel-
evant factor for the validity of party position estimates
beyond party size and age is government status. Here, we
expect government parties to thoroughly instruct their MPs
and to be more visible to experts since these actors are
largely responsible for current policymaking. Opposition
parties may emphasize specific policy dimensions in order
to highlight the government’s most startling deficiencies.
Incumbent government parties, on the contrary, will
address a broader range of issues as they vindicate their
decisions during their term in office. The electoral mani-
festos of opposition parties may thus be less suited to
extract party stances than those of government parties.
We also expect that the issue dimension under scrutiny
affects the differences between party position estimates.
Here, we hypothesize that an increased relevance of the
policy dimension at hand will decrease the differences
between elite and both expert and manifesto data (Hooghe
et al., 2010; Marks et al., 2007; Netjes and Binnema, 2007).
A final factor for systematic measurement error by experts,
loosely related to the stability and experts’ familiarity with
of the party system, is whether the parties are from Eastern
or Western Europe. Both the empirical findings by Benoit
and Laver (2007) and Hooghe et al. (2010) suggest that the
policy stances of Eastern European parties are more diffi-
cult to grasp for experts.3 Frequent switching of MPs
between parties in these countries (Tavits, 2013) suggests
a similar effect at the elite level. We will therefore include
that factor with regard to expert data. Table 1 summarizes
our expectations on the systematic differences between
party position estimates.
Data and methods
Our empirical analysis for cross-validating the party posi-
tion estimates is based on a quadripartite data structure.
The elite data on both dimensions are retrieved from the
IntUne elite surveys administered in early 2007 and late
2009 to about 1,400 MPs and 1,100 MPs, respectively, in
both Western and Central Eastern European countries
(Cotta et al., 2007, 2009). This rich data set features, inter
alia, individual-level data on the respondents’ self-
placement on a general left–right scale, their attitude
towards the European integration project, alongside their
party affiliation. Most importantly for our purposes, the
question wording on the policy positions in both dimen-
sions is very similar to that used in the CHES expert sur-
veys.4 Based on these individual-level data we obtain mean
position estimates of 217 political parties in 17 European
Union (EU) member states.
The estimates of country experts are obtained from the
2006 and the 2010 CHES data sets. The 2006 survey was
completed by 235 country experts providing data on the
left–right positions as well as the stance on European inte-
gration of 227 parties in 22 EU member states (Hooghe
et al., 2010). Analogously, the 2010 CHES data set contains
the policy positions of the party leadership of 238 parties in
28 countries (Bakker et al., 2015).
The MARPOR/CMP data is the most prominent and
comprehensive source for manually coded party position
estimates.5 It comprises manifesto-based estimates on the
general left–right dimension (Volkens et al., 2015). More
precisely, each party’s overall ideological stance is derived
from the manifesto published in the context of the most
recent national election prior to 2006 and 2010, respec-
tively. Given that political parties frequently shift their
policy positions (Adams, 2012; Laver, 2005), this approach
mitigates the problem that the absolute difference between
measures may be a simple artefact of party policy shifts
over time.
The EES data set finally includes estimates on the Eur-
opean integration dimension, based on Euromanifestos for
the European Parliament elections in 2004 and 2009 (Braun




Number of experts –
Expert agreement –
Per cent of MPs – –
Type of document (party-specific) –
Length of document –
Characteristics beyond control
Intra-party heterogeneity þ þ
Party position shift þ
Party extremism þ/– þ
Controls
Party size – –
Government party – –
Party age –
Issue salience – –
Central and Eastern Europe þ
Notes: (þ) denotes factors that increase systematic differences between
measures, (–) denotes factors that decrease systematic differences
between measures; () not applicable.
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et al., 2015).6 The data set contains 783 manifestos of 289
different parties in 27 countries and of the European Par-
liament groups. Overall, combining these four different
data sources into a single coherent data set leaves us with
a pooled cross-national sample covering 131 political par-
ties in 17 EU member states (see Online Appendix Table
A.4. for additional information on the quadripartite data
structure).
Naturally, a first prerequisite of analysing differences
between elite, expert, and manifesto scores is to extract
single party policy positions.7 As indicated above, we use
simple averaged individual evaluations in order to retrieve
the position estimates of elites and experts on both the left–
right and the European integration dimensions. These mea-
sures have been used in earlier cross-validation research
and thus facilitate comparison. While both elites and
experts assess each party’s overall ideological orientation
on an 11-point left–right continuum, the IntUne and the
CHES surveys apply different scales for capturing posi-
tions on European integration. Specifically, MPs use an
11-point scale while country experts use an alternative
scale running from 1 to 7. We thus opt to rescale these
position estimates on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.
Concerning the MARPOR/CMP data there are a series
of rival approaches to retrieve position estimates on both
the left–right and the European integration dimensions.
Here, we opt for the logit scale developed by Lowe et al.
(2011), which has materialised as the de-facto standard in
research on party policy positions. Specifically, party i’s
left–right position is given by the (logged) total number of
right statements, relative to the total number of left state-
ments in its party document
Leftrighti ¼ log
right statementsi þ 0:5
left statementsi þ 0:5
In a similar vein, the estimates on European integration
in the EES data are likewise operationalized using a logit
scale. Party i’s position on the European integration process
is defined as the logged ratio of positive versus negative
statements on European integration
European integrationi ¼ log
pro EUi þ 0:5
anti EUi þ 0:5
Unlike various alternative scaling approaches such as
the ratio scale proposed by Kim and Fording (1998,
2003), the logit scale does not make any assumptions about
its endpoints. To ensure comparability across data sources,
we rescale the left–right estimates derived from the MAR-
POR/CMP data and the EU position estimates based on the
EES data likewise from 0 to 100 based on the observed
empirical endpoints of the scale.8
Capturing most of the measurement and party charac-
teristics discussed in the previous section is rather straight-
forward. Here, we focus on the operationalization of
determining factors of substantial interest, while we discuss
the measurement of the control variables in more detail in
the Online Appendix. The extent of intra-party heterogene-
ity is captured via the index of agreement originally pro-
posed by van der Eijk (2001). This measure is particularly
well suited for the analysis of ordered rating scales as it
allows differentiating between the actual dispersion and the
skewness of a distribution. In contrast to empirical mea-
sures resorting to the standard deviation it decomposes the
frequency distribution into constituent layers, i.e. simple
component parts for which agreement can be unambigu-
ously defined. Given that our subject matter is intra-party
divergence we reverse van der Eijk’s original scale. The
hypothetical scenario in which half of a party’s MPs place
themselves on each extreme of the ordered scale constitutes
the measure’s upper bound (þ1). The lower bound (1)
accordingly describes a situation in which all party elites
place themselves in only one category, while a hypothetical
uniform distribution yields an intra-party divergence score
of 0. Similar to intra-party dissent, disagreement among
experts is captured via the index of agreement.
Our measures of party policy shifts in each dimension
are based upon the MARPOR/CMP data set. In line with
the vast majority of the literature on the dynamics of party
positions (Adams, 2012) we operationalize policy shifts as
the absolute difference between a party’s policy position at
t, i.e. in the context of the most recent election prior to 2006
and 2010, and the same party’s position at t  1, i.e. the
next to last election. For those parties for which only a
single position at t could be retrieved – mostly due to par-
ties being founded only after t  1 – we assume perfect
stability of these parties’ policy positions.
Finally, we largely follow Dahlberg’s approach (2009:
274) to capture the level of extremism of a party’s policy
position. In this context, extremism is defined as the
weighted average policy distance of a party to all other
parties in a country’s party system with the weights being
the other parties’ vote share. The major advantage of this
measure is that policy distances from smaller extremist
parties do not exert a disproportionate effect on the overall
measure. Formally, the extremism of party i is defined as
extremismi ¼
X
j 6¼ivjjpi  pjjX
j 6¼ivj
where vj is the vote share of party j and pi and pj are the
policy positions of party i and j respectively as derived
from the IntUne elite survey.
Cross-validation of elite, expert and
manifesto data
A crucial precondition for assessing each measure’s rela-
tive validity is to establish that all three measures relate to
the same latent concept. Hence, we start our empirical sec-
tion with two exploratory principal axis factor analyses
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before delving into the analysis of contributing factors to
systematic differences between measures. The rationale for
this analysis is twofold: first, it allows examining whether it
results in a single factor solution suggesting that all three
measurements load on a single, common factor (Marks,
2007). Second, the factor analysis allows us to capitalize
on the unique and comprehensive information provided by
the IntUne data. In fact, the rationale of triangulation sug-
gests that the systematic error component differs across
measures of policy positions. Therefore, triangulating the
two conventional measures based on manifesto and expert
data with position estimates derived from hard to obtain
elite data results in a combined measure with substantially
reduced systematic error which closer approximate parties’
‘true’ policy positions (Marks et al., 2007: 25). Conse-
quently, we are able to show which of the regularly gener-
ated and updated party position estimates – expert or
manifesto data – load more heavily on the common factor
and thus, provide more valid information.
The first column in Table 2 presents the results of an
exploratory principal axis factor analysis of the left–right
policy positions derived from elite, expert, and manifesto
data. Using the general eigenvalue cut-off point of 1.0 gives
us a single factor solution. As apparent from the scheme,
not only elite data, but also expert and manifesto data exhi-
bit high factor loadings, indicating that these measures
share a substantial amount of variance. At the same time,
the position estimates retained from country experts load
heavily on the common factor while the manifesto measure
yields a considerably lower factor loading. Thus, according
to the rationale of triangulation, experts seem to be the
more valid data source of left–right position estimates.
A similar pattern results from exploring the bivariate
relationship between the estimates derived from the IntUne
elite survey and the policy positions generated by the
CHES expert survey and those based on party manifestos
(for a similar approach, see e.g. Gemenis, 2012). Here, the
rationale is using elite data largely as external benchmark,
which allows assessing the relative validity of expert and
manifesto data vis-à-vis a third self-contained data source.
Specifically, columns 3 to 5 in Table 2 show the concor-
dance correlation between elite data and expert and
manifesto estimates. The concordance correlation coeffi-
cient evaluates the agreement between measurements,
takes both systematic differences (or accuracy denoted by
Cb, i.e. does the best-fit line approach the line of perfect
concordance) and random measurement error (or precision
denoted by r, i.e. do the data approach that best-fit line)
into account, and allows differentiating between the two
(Lin, 1989, 2000).9 In sum, the positive concordance cor-
relation denoting overall agreement suggest that the rela-
tionship between elite data and both expert measures and
manifesto estimates is considerably strong. However, the
concordance between elite and expert data (rc ¼ 0.87) is
substantially higher than that between elite and manifesto
data (rc ¼ 0.36). Most interestingly, we observe that most
of the disagreement between elite and expert data is due to
random error (indicated by the very high Cb), while the
higher disagreement between elite and manifesto data is
at least partly attributable to an increase in systematic dif-
ferences (denoted by the decrease in Cb).
The Bland-Altman plot depicted in Figure 1 corrobo-
rates this notion. The left panel juxtaposes the difference
between elite and expert left–right positions estimates
against the mean of the two measures. The right panel plots
differences between left–right estimates derived from elite
and the MARPOR/CMP data against the mean thereof.
These Bland-Altman plots allow exploring and detecting
differences between measures due to systematic bias.10 As
such, the two strikingly different patterns in Figure 1 pro-
vide considerable support for the initial assertion. Specifi-
cally, the line of observed average agreement in the left
panel approximates zero, while the observations cluster
around this observed average agreement and their distribu-
tion largely follows a random pattern. In contrast, the
observations in the right panel seem more dispersed and
show a considerable positive linear relationship. This, in
turn, implies a systematic relationship between party stance
and measurement error.
Specifically, the right panel displays the characteristic
centrist bias often found when exploring the validity of
document-based approaches to left–right position estimates
(e.g. Benoit et al., 2012; Gemenis, 2012). The difference
between measures is thus particularly large for political
parties at either end of the political spectrum, which the
MARPOR/CMP estimates consistently identify as more
moderate than the estimates derived from the IntUne elite
data. For moderate parties in the centre of the ideological
distribution, in contrast, Figure 1 indicates high agreement
between estimates derived from elite and MARPOR/CMP
data.
Turning to the position estimates on European integra-
tion, a somewhat different empirical picture emerges. The
results of the exploratory factor analysis in Table 3 indicate
that the three measures feature on average slightly lower
factor loadings. Thus, policy positions on European inte-
gration retrieved from elite, expert, and Euromanifesto data






Expert data 0.92 0.87 0.99 0.88
Manifesto data 0.67 0.36 0.58 0.63
Notes: N ¼ 128.
Sources: Bakker et al. (2015), Cotta et al. (2007, 2009), Hooghe et al.
(2010), and Volkens et al. (2015).
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are somewhat more difficult to array into a single underly-
ing dimension. Most strikingly, however, the results in
Table 3 indicate that elite, expert, and Euromanifesto data
exhibit similar factor loadings. According to the rationale
of triangulation, thus neither of these measures has a con-
siderable competitive advantage as the most valid data
source for estimating stances on European integration.
Exploring the bivariate relationships between measures
corroborates this finding. Again, the concordance correla-
tion coefficients in Table 3 indicate that all three measures
are positively and significantly interrelated. Yet, compared
to the left–right position estimates the level of agreement
between elite and expert data seems considerably smaller.
As a result, the concordance between elite and expert data
(rc ¼ 0.60) is now largely comparable to that between elite
and Euromanifesto data (rc ¼ 0.56).11 At the same time,
Table 3 likewise indicates that this decrease in convergence
is driven by both an increase in the systematic and the
random error components (as indicated by the decrease in
Cb and r. Part of this weaker interrelation between mea-
sures for the elites–experts dyad – compared to the left–
right estimates – may be partly due to the different scales
applied to derive EU position estimates (7-point scale for
expert evaluations and 11-point scale for elite surveys).
Plotting the difference between European integration
against the mean of these estimates shows two characteris-
tic patterns for both the elites–experts and the elites–Euro-
manifesto dyads (see Figure 2). First, agreement between
measures is particularly low for parties that generally sup-
port the European integration process. Specifically, both
expert and Euromanifesto often indicate very strong sup-
port for European integration among parties that based on
estimates derived from elite data are merely moderately
supportive of EU integration. Second and related, within
this large cluster of supportive parties, agreement between
measures is even lower as elite data reveal subtle but
important differences among pro-European parties that
both expert and Euromanifesto data are unable to uncover
(Proksch and Lo, 2012a; see also Marks et al., 2012 and
Proksch and Lo, 2012b).
Examining systematic differences between
measures
Do we find any systematic patterns that account for the
extent to which expert placements and estimates derived
from party manifestos differ from the self-placements of
political elites? We explore potential differences by first
regressing the elite estimates on the expert and (Euro) man-
ifesto estimates respectively12 and then use the absolute
residuals as dependent variables to explore potential sys-
tematic differences. The rationale for this approach is to
obtain predictions of party placements based on expert pla-
cements and party manifestos and to exploit the (absolute)
residuals to capture the extent to which these predictions
deviate from the observed elite estimates (Marks et al.,
2007: 28). Put differently, the residuals should display the
Figure 1. Bland-Altman Plot of left–right estimates. Sources: Bakker et al. (2015), Cotta et al. (2007, 2009), Hooghe et al. (2010), and
Volkens et al. (2015).






Expert data 0.79 0.60 0.91 0.66
Manifesto data 0.71 0.56 0.97 0.58
Notes: N ¼ 110.
Sources: Bakker et al. (2015), Cotta et al. (2007, 2009), Hooghe et al.
(2010), and Braun et al. (2015).
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characteristic white noise pattern if there were no systema-
tic differences between the self-placements of political
elites and expert placements and estimates derived from
party manifestos, respectively. Table 4 displays the results
of the four corresponding ordinary least squares regression
models with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.13
Figure 2. Bland-Altman plot of EU estimates. Sources: Bakker et al. (2015), Cotta et al. (2007, 2009), Hooghe et al. (2010), Braun et al. (2015).
Table 4. Explaining differences between measures.
Left–right European integration
Experts Manifestos Experts Euromanifestos
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Manipulable characteristics
Number of experts 0.04 (0.11) 0.23 (0.17)
Expert agreement 8.16* (3.91) 9.90* (4.86)
Per cent of MPs 0.08*** (0.02) 0.03 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 0.01 (0.05)
Type of document
Single party Reference group Reference group
Two or more parties 1.58 (5.08)
Estimate 12.42*** (2.32)
Main party 3.86 (3.46)
Party bloc 9.63*** (2.85)
Party leader 3.44 (2.91)
National manifesto 3.11 (5.64)
Other programme 2.30 (2.50) 0.16 (2.16)
Length of document 1.01 (0.86) 1.27 (0.78)
Characteristics beyond control
Intra-party heterogeneity 6.73 (5.46) 4.62 (8.73) 15.01** (5.56) 6.44 (5.11)
Party position shift 0.11** (0.03) 0.06 (0.26)
Party extremism 0.36 (0.57) 4.77*** (0.81) 1.42* (0.71) 4.40*** (0.79)
Controls
Party size 0.09 (0.05) 0.01 (0.08) 0.06 (0.07) 0.18 ** (0.07)
Government party 0.84 (0.92) 0.43 (1.72) 0.01 (1.57) 0.03 (1.45)
Party age 0.03 (0.03) 0.07 (0.05) 0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04)
Issue salience 5.23 (5.74) 1.20 (1.55)
Central and Eastern Europe 3.41** (1.28) 1.09 (2.22) 1.74 (1.98) 1.40 (1.95)
Constant 3.58 (6.88) 4.11 (8.68) 14.27* (6.53) 2.58 (6.88)
R2 0.29 0.30 0.27 0.39
Observations 123 129 123 109
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Sources: Bakker et al. (2015), Cotta et al. (2007, 2009), Hooghe et al. (2010), Volkens et al. (2015), Braun et al. (2015).
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The first model examines systematic differences
between left–right policy positions derived from experts
and elites. As corroborated, we observe that systematic
differences between position estimates decrease as agree-
ment among experts increases. Specifically, shifting from
no agreement (experts randomly placing parties resulting in
a uniform distribution) to perfect agreement (all experts
placing a party on the same position of the ideological
spectrum) reduces the difference between measures by
approximately eight scale points (range 0 to 100). This
corresponds to 1.5 times the root-mean-square error. In
contrast, policy positions shifts reduce systematic differ-
ences between experts and elites. Thus, contrasting the
conventional empirical picture, experts seem well aware
of party position shifts and in fact, these shifts seem to
encourage expert observers of party competition to
‘update’ their assessment of parties’ ideological position,
which in turn reduces systematic differences. Finally, we
observe that increasing the share of responding MPs adds to
the systematic differences between left–right policy posi-
tions derived from experts and elites, suggesting that the
number of elite respondents might be more important in
densely populated party systems than recent work on two-
party systems suggests.
The second model juxtaposes the left–right estimates
generated by MARPOR/CMP with those estimates derived
from political elites. As hypothesized, the selection of
coded documents has a substantial effect on the systematic
differences between estimates. However, it is the estimated
or interpolated estimates rather than those derived from
party bloc programmes or other documents such as election
speeches that disproportionately contribute to differences
between measures. In line with the bivariate picture drawn
in Figure 1, the multivariate analysis in Table 4 likewise
indicates a considerable centrist bias of estimates based on
election manifestos. Political parties located at either end of
the left–right ideological spectrum show significant and
substantial differences as increasing party extremism by
one standard deviation increases the difference between
measures by approximately 4.8 scale points. This, in turn,
corresponds to half the root-mean-square error.
Examining systematic differences between expert and
elite estimates on European integration (model 3), further
corroborates our initial empirical findings. As with the left–
right estimates, we observe that aggregating highly con-
flicting expert responses on party positions regarding Eur-
opean integration leads to increased systematic differences
between measures. In contrast, higher agreement among
political elites increases systematic bias. Although small
and homogenous regionalist parties, which portray them-
selves as unanimously pro EU, drive this finding, it indi-
cates that intra-party divergence has at least no systematic
negative effect on European integration estimates derived
from political experts.
The fourth and final model examines systematic differ-
ences between European integration position estimates
derived from elites and estimates derived from Euromani-
festos. In contrast to the position estimates on the left–right
ideological continuum, we observe that document selection
has no influence on systematic differences between mea-
sures. In this context, however, it is worth noting that over
90% of the position estimates are derived from ‘proper’
Euromanifestos and hence document selection is generally
less problematic. In addition, Table 4 indicates that parties
with more extreme positions on the European integration
dimension display disproportionate differences between
both sets of estimates. This seems to contradict the bivari-
ate assessment of ‘moderate’ parties driving differences
between measures. In this context, however, even moder-
ately pro-European parties qualify to a certain extent as
‘extremist’ parties as the operationalization is based on the
empirical distribution rather than the potential range of
values on the European integration dimension. Finally, the
elite–Euromanifestos dyad is the only one, where we
observe decreasing differences between measures with
increasing party size.
While several of our findings pertain to specific mea-
sures or a particular dimension of party competition, the
empirical analysis results in a number of general findings.
Some of these confirm established empirical patterns. At
the same time, however, the analysis also refines several of
these established findings and adds new insights into the
relative strengths and weakness of established measures.
Frist, contrasting much of the conventional wisdom in the
literature, we find no systematic effect of the number of
experts on measurement differences. Thus, rather than low
response rates, it is disagreement among experts that
appears to be a key challenge for these estimates. This, in
turn, has substantial implications for the quality of aggre-
gated expert responses (Lindstädt et al., 2020). Second,
intra-party heterogeneity has no effect on systematic dif-
ferences between measures for the elites–experts and the
elites–(Euro) manifesto dyads, respectively. Thus, neither
measure enjoys a competitive advantage in dealing with
conflicting policy positions within parties (this is not to say
that intra-party heterogeneity affects all measures equally).
Third, the selection of documents is one of the main chal-
lenges for document-based approaches interested in left–
right position estimates (Gemenis, 2012). Yet, the substan-
tial centrist bias of the MARPOR/CMP estimates persists
beyond the use of alternative documents, and is thus only
partly attributable to the higher share of non-coded coding
units (i.e. quasi-sentences) in the various alternative docu-
ments. At the same time, we do not find document length to
affect adversely the estimates derived from electoral man-
ifestos. Finally, our findings confirm that the generally low
response rates among political elites have no systematic
detrimental effect on the validity of party position estimates
(Fisher and Herrick, 2013).
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Discussion
This article presents a further step in disentangling the
variances between party position estimates derived from
elite, expert, and manifesto data. In so doing, our study
moves beyond existing research in three important aspects:
First, we test two sets of factors that explain observed dif-
ferences between elite data, on the one hand, and expert and
manifesto data, on the other. Second, we move beyond
simple cross-sectional analyses and compare party position
estimates not only on a general left–right dimension, but
also on the European integration dimension. Third, our
study benefits from the fact that all measures coming from
four different data sources are generated almost at the same
point in time. It seems thus very unlikely that our results are
biased due to simple party switches or changes in party
positions over time.
The empirical analysis results in two key findings: First,
the general left–right estimates generated by elites and
experts show a higher congruence than those derived from
party manifestos. Concerning European integration, in con-
trast to the earlier findings of Marks et al. (2007), neither
measure clearly materializes as more valid approximation
of party positions. This again highlights that source selec-
tion – in our case Euromanifestos instead of national man-
ifestos – and scaling approach – log-ratio scale instead of
conventional ratio and difference scaling – are consequen-
tial choices. Second, several factors account for systematic
differences between estimates derived from elite surveys
and those derived from the other two sources. We find
disagreement among experts substantially more important
than the mere number of experts. Neither the measure
based on elites nor experts enjoys a competitive advantage
in dealing with conflicting policy positions within parties.
We confirm the substantial centrist bias of the MARPOR/
CMP estimates that persists even when alternative docu-
ments are used. Finally, our findings confirm that the gen-
erally low response rates among political elites have no
systematic detrimental effect on the validity of party posi-
tion estimates.
In introducing the three sources from which party posi-
tions are derived, we have hinted at differences between
them due to their different nature. Specifically, they can be
seen as being more or less strategic. Party manifestos are
written to convey the image that parties consider electorally
advantageous. Yet in so doing, parties are constrained by
their records, activists, and credibility considerations. Still,
the general take at party self-positioning is that it has to be
taken with a grain of salt, that there is a need for ‘discount-
ing’ to arrive at the parties’ ‘true’ positions. Party elites,
answering spontaneously, anonymously, and without
immediate electoral context, should be less strategic. Inde-
pendent experts, in turn, should be non-strategic. The more
important a policy dimension is, the more strategic party
self-placement should be and the more estimates derived
from these different sources should diverge. Left–right has
been the dominant conflict dimension at the time of inves-
tigation and here we find divergence between our sources
corresponding with these considerations as the party posi-
tions derived from the most strategic source are the most
centrist while those from the lest strategic source, are the
most extreme.
Our results can help researchers to make better-
informed choices between party position estimates when
seeking to explain substantive phenomena with the help
of existing party placement data. Generally, cross-
validation suggests that expert data provide more valid
estimates on the left–right dimension while expert and
manifesto data seem equally trustworthy with regard to the
European integration dimension. If we relate to specific
research questions, however, and consider the nature of the
data sources, more nuanced considerations come into play.
For instance, when researchers are interested in parties’
campaign behaviour in the run-up to an election, manifes-
tos provide unique and comprehensive insights into parties’
strategic positions. Questions that refer to parties’ actual
behaviour during the legislative period, on the other hand,
might be better answered based on estimates from expert
surveys unless there are strong reasons to believe that the
specific party behaviour has had a major impact on how the
experts perceive party placements.
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Notes
1. The only cross-validation including elite data is confined to
the European integration dimension in the context of the
1990s (Marks et al., 2007).
2. Although political parties naturally determine type and length
of their election manifesto, we argue that researchers have –
at least to some extent – discretion over these characteristics.
Specifically, obtaining the ‘right’ party documents often
requires substantial archival work. In a similar vein, research-
ers may choose to complement shorter election manifestos
with additional textual data derived from leader speeches, for
instance.
3. Specifically, Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2016) suggest
that Eastern European parties have accumulated less
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reputation for their positions and thus are more flexible in
changing them. This, in turn, makes them moving targets,
which are harder to pin down for experts.
4. See the Online Appendix for the exact question wording.
5. There is, however, a vivid and ongoing debate about the
validity and reliability of the data (e.g. most recently dis-
cussed in Budge et al., 2013; Budge and Meyer, 2013; Geme-
nis, 2012, 2013). Our analyses help to systematically analyse
the respective claims by cross-validating the MARPOR
results with the IntUne data.
6. Although, as mentioned above, some estimates are derived
from speeches of leading candidates rather than from party-
(group)-specific election Euromanifestos. Note that all sub-
stantive conclusions about the different measures’ relative
validity are robust to using position estimates on European
integration derived from national party manifestos (Volkens
et al., 2015).
7. We are aware of various methods designed to estimate more
valid estimates of party positions from one source of data (e.
g., Bakker et al., 2014; König et al., 2013) or across data
sources (e.g. Lo et al., 2014). However, we abstain from using
these methods as each of them may improve the quality of
one or some estimates but not all. While we would recom-
mend the use of such methods in substantive applications of
the data, they might bias our comparisons over different types
of data.
8. All key findings are robust to using an alternative ratio scale
employed in the cross-validation analyses by Kim and Ford-
ing (2002), Marks et al. (2007), and Ray (2007) with an
explicit range constraint from –1 to 1.
9. For an in-depth discussion on the difference between agree-
ment and linear relationship between measures, see, for
instance, Altman and Bland (1983) and Bland and Altman
(1999).
10. Similar to residual versus fitted plots.
11. Note that this is an important difference to the finding
reported in Marks et al (2007), which, however, is based on
a different data source (national vs European manifestos) and
a different scaling approach.
12. An alternative approach would be regressing the factor scores
of the above factor analysis on the expert and (Euro) mani-
festo estimates and then use these residuals as dependent
variable. Here, however, information from expert and (Euro)
manifesto estimates would affect both sides of the equation
and potentially blur systematic differences between
measures.
13. See Table A.5. in the Online Appendix for a quick overview
of the key determinant factors.
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Braun D, Schmitt H, Wüst AM, et al. (2015) Euromanifestos
Project (EMP) 1979–2009. Mannheim: Mannheim Centre for
European Social Research.
Budge I (2000) Expert judgements of party policy positions: uses
and limitations in political research. European Journal of
Political Research 37(1): 103–113.
Budge I (2001) Validating party policy placements. British
Journal of Political Science 31(1): 210–223.
Budge I and Meyer T (2013) Understanding and validating the
left–right scale (RILE). In: Volkens A, Bara J, Budge I, et al.
(eds) Mapping Policy Preferences from Texts III. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp. 85–106.
Budge I, McDonald M and Meyer T (2013) Validated estimates
versus dodgy adjustments: focussing excessively on error dis-
torts results. In: Volkens A, Bara J, Budge I, et al. (eds) Map-
ping Policy Preferences from Texts III. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 69–84.
Cotta M, Isernia P and Bellucci P (2007) IntUne Mass Survey
Wave 1. ICPSR34421-v1. Ann Arbor: Inter-university Consor-
tium for Political and Social Research.
Ecker et al. 11
Cotta M, Isernia P and Bellucci P (2009) IntUne Mass Survey
Wave 2. ICPSR34272-v2. Ann Arbor: Inter-university Consor-
tium for Political and Social Research.
Dahlberg S (2009) Political parties and perceptual agreement: the
influence of party related factors on voters’ perceptions in
proportional electoral systems. Electoral Studies 28(2): 270–
278.
Downs A (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York:
Harper & Row.
Fisher SH and Herrick R (2013) Old versus new: the comparative
efficiency of mail and internet surveys of state legislators.
State Politics & Policy Quarterly 13(2): 147–163.
Gabel MJ and Huber JD (2000) Putting parties in their place:
inferring party left–right ideological positions from party man-
ifestos data. American Journal of Political Science 44(1): 94–
103.
Gemenis K (2012) Proxy documents as a source of measurement
error in the Comparative Manifestos Project. Electoral Studies
31(3): 594–604.
Gemenis K (2013) What to do (and not to do) with the Compara-
tive Manifestos Project data. Political Studies 61(1): 3–23.
Hansen ME (2008) Back to the archives? A critique of the Danish
part of the Manifesto Dataset. Scandinavian Political Studies
31(2): 201–216.
Hooghe L, Bakker R, Brigevich A, et al. (2010) Reliability and
validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys on
party positioning. European Journal of Political Research
49(5): 687–703.
Keman H (2007) Experts and manifestos: Different sources –
same results for comparative research? Electoral Studies
26(1): 76–89.
Kim H-M and Fording RC (1998) Voter ideology in Western
democracies, 1946–1989. European Journal of Political
Research 33(1): 73–97.
Kim H-M and Fording RC (2002) Government partisanship in
Western democracies, 1945–1998. European Journal of Polit-
ical Research 41(2): 187–206.
Kim H-M and Fording RC (2003) Voter ideology in Western
democracies. An update. European Journal of Political
Research 42(1): 95–105.
König T, Marbach M and Osnabrügge M (2013) Estimating
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